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ST. LOUIS BLUES: THE URBAN CRISIS IN THE GATEWAY CITY 
COLIN GORDON* 
The housing crash and subsequent recession returned our collective 
attention to the dismal state of American cities. The last six years have 
reminded us of the precarious state of our inner cities, and of the failed public 
policies and predatory private policies that got us to that point.1 And they have 
pushed that failure and misery into the suburbs—making more visible and 
more universal the experience of urban crisis or decline.2 Abandoned or half-
finished suburban tracts on the fringes of Las Vegas or Fort Lauderdale mark a 
new frontier for that crisis, but it has been with us now for over half a century. 
Over that span, the American urban crisis has been defined by a common 
set of conditions or circumstances. Those conditions and circumstances, in 
turn, were (and in some respects remain) more pronounced in St. Louis than 
almost anywhere else.3 “St. Louis is not a typical City,” noted one observer in 
the late 1970s, “but, like a Eugene O’Neill play, it shows a general condition in 
a stark and dramatic form.”4 
First, the American urban crisis is marked by a pattern of general, but 
locally uneven, demographic and economic decline. It is not so much that 
“cities” declined, as that central cities (and later inner suburbs) declined 
 
* Colin Gordon, Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, University of Iowa. 
 1. See Paul Taylor et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and 
Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/ 
SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf; Tatjana Meschede et al., The Racial Wealth Gap 
Increases Fourfold, INST. ON ASSETS AND SOC. POL’Y (May 2010), available at http://www.in 
sightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/IASP-Racial-Wealth-Gap-Brief-May2010.pdf; KATRIN ANACKER 
ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON 
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/re 
search/ncrc_foreclosurewhitepaper_2011.pdf. 
 2. See Emily Garr & Elizabeth Kneebone, The Suburbanization of Poverty, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Jan. 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/20%20pover 
ty%20kneebone/0120_poverty_paper.pdf. 
 3. See COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN 
CITY 10 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008); Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the American City, 
HARVARD WORLD MAP, http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/866 (last visited APR. 22, 2014). 
 4. GORDON, supra note 3, at 8. 
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relative to the rest of the metropolitan region of which they were a part.5 Of 
our fifteen largest central cities in 1950, eleven saw their peak population in 
that year—the only exceptions being New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and 
Houston.6 And the others didn’t just stop growing: nine of those cities lost 
more than a quarter of their population over the next fifty years, and five (St. 
Louis, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Cleveland) lost more than half.7 
Consider St. Louis. In 1930, the metropolitan area encompassed four 
counties (two in Missouri, two on the Illinois side) and a population of about 
1.3 million—of which over 60 percent lived in the City of St. Louis.8 In 1970, 
the metro area included two more counties on the Missouri side, and growth 
was confined to the suburbs: the City claimed barely a quarter of the 
metropolitan population (620,000 of 2.36 million).9 By 2010, the metro area 
sprawled across seventeen counties and the City claimed just 10 percent of the 
metro population (now nudging 3 million).10 Population density, about 1,000 
persons per square mile in 1960, was less than a third of that (322 persons per 
square mile) by 2010. In 1950, St. Louis was the eighth largest city in the 
nation; it is now the fifty-third largest.11 
Second, this decline—but more importantly its unevenness—yielded an 
increasingly stark pattern of concentrated poverty and racial segregation. 
Alongside the shared prosperity of the postwar boom and the slow but steady 
gains of the postwar civil rights movement, central cities seemed to drift in the 
opposite direction—becoming poorer, more deeply segregated, and more 
isolated over time.12 Nowhere was this truer than in St. Louis, a city whose 
postwar demographics were starkly biracial (those identifying themselves as 
 
 5. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 4 (1985). 
 6. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places and Other Urban Places in the United 
States: 1790 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbls.18, 19 (May 12, 2012) [hereinafter Population 
of the 100 Largest], http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps00 
27.html. 
 7. Population of the 100 Largest, supra note 6, at tbls.18, 22. 
 8. USA Metropolitan Area & Core Cities Population Trends: 1930-1940, DEMOGRAPHIA, 
www.demographia.com/db-metro1940.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 9. Major US Metropolitan Areas: Core City & Suburban Population 2000-2008, 
DEMOGRAPHIA (Sept. 27, 2009), http://demographia.com/db-msacore.pdf. 
 10. St. Louis City QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 
2013), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2965000.html. 
 11. Charles D. Schmitz, St. Louis is a World-Class City, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 
30, 2010), www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/article_e07eb3b8-73b2-5a69-8893-3497c1756b 
f2.html. 
 12. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 4–5 (1993); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, 
CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 52 (2007); MICHAEL B. 
KATZ, WHY DON’T AMERICAN CITIES BURN? 51–52 (2012). 
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black or white made up 99 percent of the metro population every census year 
until 1990, and still make up more than 95 percent) and whose local housing 
patterns have marked it as one of the nation’s “hypersegregated” metropolitan 
areas.13 
All of this is evident not just in racial occupancy patterns, but in race 
relations as well. Racial transition in American cities in the 1930s and 1940s 
yielded a nasty pattern of segregation and discrimination enforced and 
sustained by restrictive deed instruments, private realty, federal housing and 
mortgage policies, local zoning, and an enthusiasm for urban renewal that 
equated black occupancy with blight.14 Again, St. Louis stood out. It was no 
accident that St. Louis—a city whose organization of property followed the 
pattern of most northern settings but whose race relations were essentially 
southern—was ground zero for virtually all of the key legal battles over race 
and property in the modern era.15 
Third, decline brought with it dramatic disinvestment—even 
abandonment—in older residential and commercial areas.16 This occurred 
despite (and sometimes because of) the urban renewal programs that were 
meant to save the cities.17 And, as property fell in value (or off the tax rolls 
entirely), local fiscal capacity collapsed—further undermining the public 
services and goods (streets, schools, sewers) that made neighborhoods viable.18 
Local government, flush with federal redevelopment and highway funds, 
 
 13. See Heather I. Macdonald, Mortgage Lending and Residential Integration in a 
Hypersegregated MSA: The Case of St. Louis, 35 URB. STUD. 1971, 1973 (1998) (discussing the 
St. Louis patterns); John Farley, Race, Not Class: Explaining Racial Housing Segregation in the 
St. Louis Metropolitan Area, 2000, 38 SOC. FOCUS 133, 137 (2005); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy 
A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along 
Five Dimension, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373, 388 (1989); Robert E. Mendelson & Michael A. Quinn, 
Residential Patterns in a Midwestern City: The St. Louis Experience, in THE METROPOLITAN 
MIDWEST: POLICY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 151, 158–60 (Barry Checkoway & 
Carl Patton eds., 1985); DAVID LASLO, A BRIEF DEMOGRAPHIC AND SPATIAL HISTORY OF THE 
ST. LOUIS REGION: 1950–2000, at 11 (2003). 
 14. PRESTON H. SMITH, RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE BLACK METROPOLIS: HOUSING 
POLICY IN POSTWAR CHICAGO 212 (2012). 
 15. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (holding state enforcement of race 
restrictive deed covenants to be unconstitutional); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) 
(holding the Civil Rights Act protects private real estate transactions); United States v. City of 
Black Jack, 509 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing an early exclusionary zoning case). 
 16. ALAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., FACING THE URBAN CHALLENGE: THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND AMERICA’S OLDER DISTRESSED CITIES 6 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18%20shrinking%20cities%20 
mallach/0518_shrinking_cities_mallach.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 16–17. 
 18. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND 
STABILITY 84–85 (1997). 
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became a sort of centrifuge that flung people, employment, and tax capacity to 
the suburban fringes.19 
In St. Louis, these patterns were exaggerated by underlying economic 
weaknesses (deindustrialization hit earlier and harder than it did in even the 
rest of the rustbelt20), by the unusually fragmented structure of local 
government,21 and by state and regional patterns of zoning and land use which 
placed few restraints on sprawl.22 As a result, population, development, and 
infrastructure sprawled west—leaving some North St. Louis neighborhoods 
largely deserted, the remaining houses scattered like tombstones across 
untended swaths of vacant land.23 What was commonly labeled “white flight” 
was, in greater St. Louis—black flight as well, as African-Americans moved 
steadily out of the City and into the postage-stamp municipalities of north St. 
Louis County.24 
CIRCUMSTANCE, CONSEQUENCE, AND CAUSE 
In the broader economic context of the last century, St. Louis faced some 
tough odds. But it is a mistake to ascribe urban decline to the immutable 
market forces of suburbanization, deindustrialization, and globalization and 
leave it at that. There was nothing inevitable about the scale or severity or 
character of St. Louis’ urban crisis—all of which were shaped as much by 
public policy and political choices as they were by secular economic and 
demographic changes. It is not necessary to revisit all of those policies and 
choices here.25 But I would like to underscore two important factors that—
especially in combination—fundamentally shaped the St. Louis experience. 
A. Race 
As St. Louis and its suburbs navigated the last century, race relations 
indelibly colored the motives and the consequences of public policy. The 
 
 19. MALLACH, supra note 16, at 8. 
 20. See Scott Cummings, Racial Inequality and Development Disparities in the St. Louis 
Region, in ST. LOUIS METROMORPHOSIS: PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 99, 104–07, 
112–14 (Brady Baybeck & E. Terrence Jones eds., 2004). 
 21. See Anja Kurki, Measuring Metropolitan Government Structure and its Impact on 
Income Distribution in Metropolitan Areas (paper presented at the American Political Science 
Meeting, Atlanta, 1999), http://localgov.fsu.edu/readings_papers/form%20of%20govt/Kurki_ 
Metropolitan_Inequalites.pdf. 
 22. See ROLF PENDALL ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED: A 
REVIEW OF THE LAND USE REGULATIONS IN THE NATION’S 50 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS 
12–19 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/8/metro 
politanpolicy%20pendall/20060802_pendall.pdf. 
 23. See Cummings, supra note 20, at 100–01, 104. 
 24. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 23, 25. 
 25. See generally id. 
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desire to regulate and limit African-American occupancy animated the earliest 
efforts at land-use planning—including the profusion of private streets in the 
city’s early residential development.26 From 1915 to 1916, long before 
conventional urban zoning was even a consideration, city planners pressed for 
a racial zoning ordinance that would have confined African-Americans to the 
Ville neighborhood in North St. Louis and a scattering of nonresidential tracts 
along the river or the rail beds running inland.27 The ordinance passed, but its 
implementation was stalled by the Supreme Court’s back-handed admonition 
(in Buchanan v Warley) that such laws deprived white property owners of the 
right to sell or convey their property as they saw fit.28 
In the wake of the 1917 ruling in Buchanan, and in the shadow of the East 
St. Louis race riot the same year, local real estate interests moved to implement 
the restriction by other means.29 These included an “unrestricted zone” (closely 
resembling the footprint of black occupancy contained in the 1916 ordinance) 
enforced by the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange, which effectively outlawed 
sales to African-Americans in most of the city.30 This was accompanied by a 
profusion of race restrictive deed covenants which established more explicit 
and enforceable neighborhood schemes of segregation.31 These agreements, 
numbering almost 400 in the city by the early 1940s, covered large swaths of 
largely white South St. Louis and surrounded the Ville in North St. Louis.32 
And these agreements were standard issue in the early suburban development 
west of the city, effectively barring African-Americans from all but a few 
enclaves in St. Louis County and beyond.33 
These restrictive instruments were important both for the ways in which 
they shaped the urban landscape in the years before conventional zoning and 
land use planning, and for the ways in which they were incorporated into—and 
perpetuated by—the public policies that followed. When the city and its 
suburbs moved forward with modern zoning ordinances in the 1930s and 
1940s, they did so with the explicit intent of sustaining racial restrictions.34 In 
St. Louis, where land zoning was implemented after the fact, city planners 
protected white neighborhoods with single family designations while lumping 
 
 26. Id. at 69. 
 27. Id. at 70–71. 
 28. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Roger Rice, Residential Segregation by 
Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179, 194 (1968) 
 29. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 71; HARPER BARNES, NEVER BEEN A TIME: THE 1917 
RACE RIOT THAT SPARKED THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 69 (2008). 
 30. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 73, 75. 
 31. See id. at 73. 
 32. Id. at 73. 
 33. See id. at 73, 75. 
 34. See id. at 83. 
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virtually identical neighborhoods on the North side into multifamily zones.35 
When the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation risk-rated St. Louis neighborhoods 
for New Deal-Era housing policies (including new long-term mortgages 
backed by the Federal House Administration), they turned to local real estate 
interests who—unsurprisingly—used patterns of black occupancy and the 
presence (or absence) of restrictive deed covenants as the primary determinant 
of neighborhood prospects.36 
To add insult to injury, the policies intended to arrest urban decline 
proceeded from exactly the same assumptions. Urban renewal programs, 
including “slum clearance” projects in St. Louis and its suburbs, consistently 
equated black occupancy with “blight.”37 Public housing, erected to warehouse 
those displaced by urban renewal, hardened patterns of local segregation—in 
part because suburban municipalities and counties, for most of this era, refused 
to even create public housing authorities.38 Public improvements, including the 
urban highway infrastructure, skirted white neighborhoods and bulldozed 
across black neighborhoods.39 By the end of the 1970s, one in ten St. Louis 
families—the overwhelming majority of them African-American—had been 
displaced by urban renewal or highway development.40 
The development of Greater St. Louis was shaped by both the “Berlin 
Wall” of the city’s western border and by the “Delmar Divide” that split the 
city itself down the middle.41 The confluence of private and public policies—
animated and motivated by racial anxiety or animus—led to radically different 
developmental trajectories in St. Louis and in its suburbs, and in North and 
South St. Louis.42 The consequences are lasting and sustained. The 
disinvestment that followed from discriminatory federal and state and local 
policies only ensured that neglected neighborhoods would fall further behind—
and harden the view that they posed a threat to public safety, public finance, 
and property values. And, because that discrimination was attached so firmly 
to property (the primary source of family and intergenerational wealth), it 
ensured that African-Americans would make little economic progress, even as 
the legal edifice of “Jim Crow” and its Northern variants slowly collapsed.43 
 
 35. See id. at 124–25. 
 36. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 88–91. 
 37. See id. at 205. 
 38. See id. at 99–100. 
 39. See id. at 206. 
 40. See id. 
 41. GORDON, supra note 3, at 125, 131. 
 42. Id. at 145–46. 
 43. See William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo, Race and the Value of Owner-Occupied 
Housing 1940-1990 (LEVY ECON. INST. Working Paper No. 310, 2000); William J. Collins & 
Robert A. Margo, Race and Home Ownership: A Century-Long View, 38 EXPLORATIONS IN 
ECON. HIST. 68, 68–69 (2001). See generally SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URB. INST., LESS 
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B. Political Fragmentation 
The other major factor shaping the development of Greater St. Louis was 
political fragmentation. In one respect, American cities and municipalities are 
notoriously undergoverned. Most municipal functions and responsibilities flow 
from the police power to safeguard public welfare and safety.44 In many areas 
(think transportation or schools), cities are simply the political and fiscal 
handmaidens of state and federal policy. But, in another important respect, 
American metros are over-governed, their key responsibilities fragmented 
across scores, sometime hundreds, of overlapping and competing 
jurisdictions.45 This jurisdictional disarray alone has had enormous 
implications—most of them negative—for local land use, zoning, economic 
development, and fiscal capacity.46 Each metropolitan area represents an 
organic economic, social, and demographic unit. It has its assets, challenges, 
and liabilities. But, carved up into a patchwork of competing fiefdoms, local 
governance becomes a scramble to hoard the assets, shirk the challenges, and 
press the liabilities onto some other municipal fragment.47 
In Greater St. Louis, this fragmentation invited and encouraged local 
governments to engage in the forms of racial discrimination and segregation 
sketched above. Local zoning—including the prevalence of large lot single-
family zones, a virtual prohibition on multifamily housing in the central outer 
suburbs, and the inability or unwillingness of the city and the inner suburbs to 
accomplish either of these restrictions—intentionally and effectively sorted the 
metropolitan population by class and race.48 Similarly, the erection of public 
housing—dense on the margins of the city’s urban renewal projects, and 
virtually non-existent elsewhere in the metro area—ensured a distribution of 
poverty (and its costs) according to political calculation and political 
capacity.49 
The perils of fragmentation are also evident in the distribution of economic 
resources. Deindustrialization devastated many central cities, but metropolitan 
economies—even in as troubled a setting as St. Louis--continued to grow. So 
while the market might be blamed for some of the losses—the industrial 
wreckage on the riverfront, the shuttered plants running along the city’s rail 
 
THAN EQUAL: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN WEALTH ACCUMULATION (Apr. 2013), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412802-Less-Than-Equal-Racial-Disparities-in-Wealth-Ac 
cumulation.pdf. 
 44. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 95 (1990). 
 45. Id. at 73. 
 46. Id. at 60. 
 47. NEIL LITTLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 2–3 
(1962); ORFIELD, supra note 18, at 5–6; Briffault, supra note 44, at 10–11. 
 48. LITTLEFIELD, supra note 47, at 4. 
 49. Briffault, supra note 44, at 100. 
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corridors—the durability of those losses, and the fact that the gains were 
hoarded elsewhere, was all driven by politics and policy. 
Indeed, much of the economic growth in St. Louis County and the outer 
suburbs came at the expense of the city. The inner suburb of Clayton 
reinvented itself as a corporate park, using zoning and economic incentives to 
poach the city of much of its central business district in the 1950s and 1960s.50 
When General Motors closed its plant in North St. Louis in the early 1980s, it 
moved production to nearby Wentzville and to Bowling Green (Ohio)—both 
sites prepared to offer substantial tax incentives for the move.51 In 1948, the 
combined private sector job base of St. Louis and St. Louis County was about 
half a million—and almost 95 percent of those jobs in the City of St. Louis. 
Fifty years later, that job base had almost doubled—but less than a third 
remained in the city.52 
There was nothing natural or inevitable about this shift. Suburban 
municipalities did everything they could to pick off the city’s assets (and each 
other’s), luring most of the region’s office space, retail space, and production 
facilities to the urban fringe by the 1980s.53 Local governments played musical 
chairs with economic development, pushing subsidized shopping malls west 
into the cornfields and all but abandoning those built just years earlier.54 This 
strategy was abetted by municipal fragmentation, by Missouri’s peculiar sales 
tax system (which allowed local governments to declare themselves “point of 
origin” cities and keep the taxes generated within their borders), and by the 
loose interpretation of urban renewal law (which allowed local governments to 
label anything on which the paint had dried as “blighted”).55 As with the 
parallel demographic shifts, the metropolitan economy did not decline—but it 
thinned out, and became both more uneven and more unequal. 
THE STAKES 
None of this would matter much—at least as a political issue—if different 
policies would simply have yielded a different distribution of winners and 
losers. But it’s pretty clear that everyone lost; that St. Louis today is a lesser 
 
 50. GORDON, supra note 3, at 131, 145–47. 
 51. Id. at 131, 138. 
 52. Earl Kersten & D. Reid Ross, Clayton: A New Metropolitan Focus in the St. Louis Area, 
58 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 637, 644–46 (1968). 
 53. Greg LeRoy & Sara Hinkley, Opportunities for Linking Movements: Workforce 
Development and Smart Growth, GOODS JOBS FIRST (2000), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/ 
default/files/docs/pdf/workforce.pdf. 
 54. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the 
Elusive Definition of ‘Blight,’ 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 319 (2004). 
 55. EAST-WEST GATEWAY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND FISCAL IMPACTS 
OF THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION, FINAL REPORT 29 (Jan. 
2011), available at http://www.ewgateway.org/library/reports/reports-pg2/reports-pg2.htm. 
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city—in qualitative and quantitative terms—than it might have been. The 
victories, such as they were, were temporary. St. Louis County fought tooth 
and nail with the city over basic development and planning issues for decades, 
much of this with the goal of insulating the county and its municipalities from 
the perceived costs of more inclusionary policies.56 The result? Disinvestment 
and fiscal troubles in the city pushed migration west into the county—where 
the clear majority of the metro’s African-Americans now live.57 The line 
between urban crisis and suburban affluence is moving steadily west. 
And local victories, such as they were, invariably came at the expense of 
the region as a whole. If two outer suburbs battled over who landed the next 
Target or Walmart, the result was predictable: a spanking new retail store 
(often accompanied by closing of another one) that paid little if any local taxes 
for the foreseeable future.58 If those suburbs sat out the contest, they might not 
be able to control where in the metropolitan region that new store would be 
built—but it, and its taxable value, would show up somewhere. A local 
government might crow about landing episodic new investment, but—across 
the metro, and in the long run—the benefits dissipated. Local tax breaks 
shaped the distribution of new investment across the metropolitan region, but 
not its level.59 In the bargain, they shaped the distribution of the tax base but 
actually reduced its returns.60 And the persistence of this competition meant 
that all such investments were less durable, and unlikely to outlive their tax 
abatements. 
Even more importantly, we have—in allowing our cities to decline–
squandered a precious political and economic resource. Cities drive the 
economy (our top 100 metros, on merely 12 percent our land area, account for 
at least three-quarters of GDP).61 Historically and currently, our metropolitan 
regions are home to the best jobs and opportunities—and to the institutions, 
including private and public sector trade unionism, that help to sustain job 
quality. This combination of union density and residential density discourages 
competition on wages and encourages competition on efficiency and quality: it 
blocks the economic low road and paves the high road. This benefits workers 
and their employers, for whom the benefits of the high road settings (a well-
trained workforce, easy access to suppliers and consumers, decent public 
goods) far outweigh the costs.62 
 
 56. Gordon, supra note 54, at 305, 319. 
 57. EAST-WEST GATEWAY, supra note 55, at 29–30; Gordon, supra note 54. 
 58. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 181-84. 
 59. EAST-WEST GATEWAY, supra note 55, at 30–31. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See ALAN BERUBE, METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INST., METRONATION: HOW 
U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS FUEL AMERICAN PROSPERITY 32 (2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2007/11/06-metronation-berube. 
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Cities house our best schools and our leading cultural institutions. Cities 
are, by any measure, green and cleaner than sparser forms of economic or 
residential development.63 And cities, by virtue of their density and diversity, 
nurture inclusive and progressive politics. Perhaps the starkest determinant of 
the presidential vote in 2012 was population density: across red and blue states, 
98 percent of the most densely-populated counties went to Obama, and 98 
percent of the least densely-populated counties went to Romney.64 The 
takeaway would seem to be this: People who live close to one another are more 
tolerant and empathetic; they are more likely to know someone of a different 
color, a different income group, or a different sexual orientation.65 They rely 
upon and appreciate the provision of public goods and public services (transit, 
parks, garbage collection)—even as they consume fewer public dollars than 
their red state counterparts.66 And they have a deeper appreciation of the 
regulatory standards (guns, labor conditions, food, public health) that promise 
us a modicum of safety and security.67 
Yet, for all of their natural advantages and assets, metropolitan areas like 
Greater St. Louis are in real trouble. That trouble stems not from the viability 
of the American cities in the new global economy, but from the unequal 
distribution of economic assets and rewards within those cities. While racial 
segregation, in St. Louis and elsewhere, has eased somewhat,68 economic 
segregation has hardened in the last generation. In 1970 only 15 percent of 
families lived in neighborhoods that could be considered as either affluent 
(those where median incomes were greater than 150 percent of median income 
in their metropolitan areas) or poor (those where median incomes were less 
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than 67 percent of metropolitan median income).69 By 2007, twice the share of 
families—over 30 percent—lived in such neighborhoods.70 
These patterns of local inequality are starker in settings (like St. Louis) 
with deeper histories of racial segregation, and they are starker in settings (like 
St. Louis) where law and politics pose few obstacles to sprawl. In 1950, 
American cities encompassed about 70 million in persons and about 13,000 
square miles.71 Fifty years later, the urban population had doubled but its 
footprint—at over 50,000 square miles—had increased fourfold.72 The 
population of the St. Louis metro, as we have seen, grew much more slowly 
(from about 1.3 million to about 2 million over the same span), while the 
urbanized area increased almost sixfold.73 All of this exaggerated the 
background conditions—racial and economic segregation, political and 
jurisdictional fragmentation—that have shaped the modern history of greater 
St. Louis. And all of this sustained and deepened the erosion of the natural 
solidarities—schools, churches, unions, community groups—that might have 
made a difference. 
This is not, in the end, really about “urban decline” at all. American 
metropolitan regions have prospered, and their importance to our polity and to 
our economy has grown over time. But the distribution of resources and 
opportunities within those metropolitan regions have been (and remain) 
dramatically and intentionally uneven. In this sense, American cities—St. 
Louis foremost among them—focus our attention on the larger challenge of 
pervasive and growing inequality. The problem is not urban decline, but 
inequality that is organized and embedded and sustained in local geography. 
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